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Abstract
Shamir’s (n, k) threshold secret sharing is an important component of several cryptographic protocols, such
as those for secure multiparty-computation and key management. These protocols typically assume the presence of
direct communication links from the dealer to all participants, in which case the dealer can directly pass the shares
of the secret to each participant. In this paper, we consider the problem of secret sharing when the dealer does not
have direct communication links to all the participants, and instead, the dealer and the participants form a general
network. Existing methods are based on secure message transmissions from the dealer to each participant requiring
considerable coordination in the network. In this paper, we present a distributed algorithm for disseminating shares
over a network, which we call the SNEAK algorithm, requiring each node to know only the identities of its one-
hop neighbours. While SNEAK imposes a stronger condition on the network by requiring the dealer to be what
we call k-propagating rather than k-connected as required by the existing solutions, we show that in addition to
being distributed, SNEAK achieves significant reduction in the communication cost and the amount of randomness
required.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shamir’s classical (n, k) secret sharing scheme [2] is an essential ingredient of several cryptographic protocols.
The scheme considers a set of (n+1) entities: a dealer and n honest-but-curious participants. The dealer possesses
a secret s and wishes to pass functions (called shares) of this secret to the n participants, such that the following
two properties are satisfied:
• k-secret-recovery: the shares of any k participants suffice to recover the secret,
• (k − 1)-collusion-resistance: the aggregate data gathered by any (k − 1) nodes reveals no knowledge (in the
information-theoretic sense) about the secret.
Several cryptographic protocols in the literature require execution of one or more instances of secret sharing among
all the participants. These include protocols for secure multiparty-computation [3]–[6], secure key management [7],
[8], general Byzantine agreement between all participants [3], [9]–[11], proactive secret sharing [12], [13], and
secure archival storage [14]. For instance, under the celebrated Ben-Or-Goldwasser-Wigderson (BGW) protocol
[3] for secure-multiparty function computation, the initialization step requires n instances of secret sharing with all
participants, and every multiplication operation requires 2n additional instances.
Most protocols including those listed above assume that the dealer has direct secure communication links to
every participant. In this case, the dealer can compute the shares as per Shamir’s scheme [2] and directly pass the
shares to the respective participants. Such a setting is depicted in Fig. 1a for the parameters (n = 6, k = 2). In
many situations, however, the dealer may not have direct communication links with every participant; instead, the
dealer and the participants may form a general network. Fig. 1b depicts such a scenario. The network is described
by a graph G with (n + 1) nodes. These (n + 1) nodes comprise the dealer and the n participants. An edge in
this graph implies a communication link between its two end-points, while the absence of an edge denotes the
non-existence of any direct communication link. We make the standard assumption that the communication links
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(b) Dealer and participants form a general network
Fig. 1: Shamir’s secret sharing for k = 2 and n = 6. (a) All participants (1, . . . , 6) are connected directly to the dealer (D),
allowing the dealer to directly pass the shares. The share of participant i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) is s+ ir, where s is the secret and r is
a value chosen uniformly at random from the finite field of operation F7. (b) The dealer and the participants form a general
network, where the dealer cannot pass shares directly to participants 3, 4, 5 and 6.
between the participants are secure. We will say that a participant is ‘directly connected to the dealer’ if there exists
an edge from the dealer to that participant.
Under a general network G, all communication between the dealer and any participant who is not directly
connected to it, must pass through other participants in the network. This poses the challenge of not leaking any
additional information to any participant while disseminating the shares over the network.
Existing methods use separate secure message transmissions (SMT) from the dealer to each participant across
the network [15]. Under such a solution, in order to communicate the designated share to a participant, the dealer
treats this share as a secret, employs Shamir’s scheme to compute k shares of this secret, and communicates these k
shares to the participant through k node-disjoint paths. (This solution is described in more detail in Section III-B.)
Thus solution requires a significant coordination in the network in setting up the node-disjoint paths from the dealer
to every participant. It also incurs a high communication cost, since the dealer needs to transmit shares across the
network separately for every participant.
In this paper, we present a distributed and communication-efficient algorithm for secret share dissemination across
a network, which we call SNEAK1. We analyze the performance of SNEAK and compare it to the state-of-the-art,
i.e., the SMT-based solution. In addition to being distributed, SNEAK provides significant gains in terms of the
communication cost and the amount of randomness required. On the other hand, while the SMT-based solution
requires the graph to satisfy a certain “k-connected-dealer” condition (which is in fact necessary for the feasibility
of secret sharing), SNEAK imposes a stronger condition on the network, which we call the k-propagating-dealer
condition, that will be formalized in the sequel.
We now present a toy example illustrating the existing SMT-based solution and SNEAK proposed in this paper.
Example 1: Consider the network depicted in Fig. 1b. Let n = 6 and k = 2, with the alphabet of operation as
the finite field F7. Under Shamir’s scheme of encoding the secret s, the share ti (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) for participant i is
ti = s+ ir ,
where r is a value chosen by the dealer uniformly at random from the alphabet F7. While the dealer can directly
pass the shares t1 and t2 to participants 1 and 2 respectively, the difficulty arises in communicating shares to
the remaining participants with whom the dealer does not have direct communication links. For instance, if the
dealer tries to pass share t3 to participant 3 by simply communicating t3 along the path ‘dealer → 1 → 3’, then
participant 1 gains access to two shares, t1 and t3. Using these two shares, participant 1 can recover the secret
s, thus violating the (k − 1)-collusion resistance requirement.
1‘SNEAK’ standing for ‘Secret-sharing over a Network with Efficient communication And distributed Knowledge-of-topology’.
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Fig. 2: Secret sharing across the network of Fig. 1b, for n=6 and k=2: (a) the SMT-based solution, employing separate secure
message transmissions from the dealer to each participant, and (b) our new SNEAK. The text on an edge is the data passed
by the node with the lower index to the node with the higher index. See Example 1 for more details.
The SMT-based solution is illustrated in the sequence of steps depicted in Fig. 2a. In order to pass the share t3 to
participant 3, the dealer chooses another random value r3, passes (t3 + r3) along the path ‘dealer → 1 → 3’, and
r3 along the path ‘dealer → 2 → 3’. Now, participant 3 can recover t3, and no participant gains any additional
information about the secret s in this process. In a similar manner, the dealer can communicate ti (4 ≤ i ≤ 6) to
participant i through k=2 node-disjoint paths as shown in the figure.
Observe that the SMT-based solution transmits data across several hops in the network in every step, but the data
transmitted in any step is never used in subsequent steps of the protocol. Thus, in order to design an efficient and
distributed algorithm, one may wish to propagate data in a manner that allows its subsequent reuse downstream.
4This is the key idea underlying SNEAK proposed in this paper, which is illustrated in the sequence of steps in
Fig. 2b. Here, the dealer first draws two values r and ra uniformly at random from F7. The dealer then passes the
two values (s+ r) and (r+ ra) to node 1, and the two values (s+ 2r) and (r+ 2ra) to node 2. Upon receiving its
data, each node passes a particular linear combination of its received data to each of its downstream neighbours.
For instance, node 1 passes (s+r)+3(r+ra) to node 3, which can equivalently be written as (s+3r)+(r+3ra).
Node 2 passes (s+ 2r) + j(r + 2ra) (= (s+ jr) + 2(r + jra)) to node j ∈ {3, 4} respectively. Node 3 can thus
recover the two values (s + 3r) and (r + 3ra) from the data it receives. Similarly, as shown in the sequence of
steps depicted in Fig. 2b, every node i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} can recover its requisite share (s+ ir), along with a random
counterpart (r+ ira) which is used to disseminate shares further downstream. Note that in Fig. 2b, the expression
written above an edge is the linear combination that is transmitted, and the corresponding expression written in
the parenthesis below that edge is a simple rewriting of the data transmitted.
We can see that SNEAK is completely distributed requiring knowledge of only one-hop neighbours as opposed
to the SMT-based solution which requires the knowledge of the global topology in order to set-up communication
over node-disjoint paths. Also, SNEAK requires a communication of only 12 values, as opposed to 24 under the
SMT-based solution. The number of random values generated under SNEAK is only 2, whereas the SMT-based
solution requires generation of 5 random values.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a formal description of the system
model and summarizes the results of this paper. Section III reviews related literature. Section IV describes SNEAK.
Section V presents a comparative analysis of the SMT-based solution, SNEAK, and the lower bounds in terms
of the communication-cost and the randomness requirements. Section VI presents conclusions and discusses open
problems.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A. Secret Sharing in a General Network
The dealer possesses a secret s that is drawn from some alphabet A, and wishes to pass shares of this secret
to n participants. The dealer and the participants form a communication network, denoted by graph G. The graph
G has (n + 1) nodes comprising the dealer and the n participants, and an edge in the graph denotes a secure
and private communication link between the two end-points. Thus, at times, we will also refer to a participant
as a node of the graph. We will also use the terms ‘network’ and ‘graph’ interchangeably, and ‘link’ and ‘edge’
interchangeably. The problem is to design a protocol which will allow the dealer to pass shares (of the secret)
to the n participants, meeting the requirements of (k − 1)-collusion-resistance and k-secret-recovery (described in
Section I). All the participants are assumed to be honest-but-curious, i.e., they follow the protocol correctly, but
may store any accessible data in order to gain information about the secret. The edges in the graph G are allowed
to be directed or undirected: a directed edge implies existence of only a one way communication link, while an
undirected edge implies direct communication links both ways. The parameters n and k are assumed to satisfy
n ≥ k > 1, since n ≤ k − 1 prohibits the secret from ever being recovered, while k = 1 degenerates the problem
into a trivial case wherein no secrecy is required.
We now discuss a condition that the graph G must necessarily satisfy for any algorithm to successfully perform
secret sharing on it, which directly follows from [15].
Definition 1 (m-connected-dealer): A graph with (n+ 1) nodes (the dealer and n participants) satisfies the m-
connected-dealer condition for a positive integer m if each of the n participants in the graph either has an incoming
edge directly from the dealer or has at least m node-disjoint paths from the dealer to itself.
Proposition 1 (Necessary condition [15]): For any graph G, a necessary condition for any algorithm to perform
(n, k) secret sharing is that G satisfies the k-connected-dealer condition.
Thus no algorithm can operate successfully on all network topologies, and must require the graph G to obey at
least the k-connected-dealer condition.
5(a) Layered network (b) Backbone network (c) One-dimensional geometric network (e.g., sensors deployed
on a border)
Fig. 3: Examples of undirected networks satisfying the 3-propagating-dealer condition. Any node in the network may be the
dealer.
B. Class of Networks Considered
We saw above in Proposition 1 that feasibility of secret sharing on a graph G requires G to satisfy the k-connected-
dealer condition. SNEAK requires the communication network G to satisfy a stronger condition, which we term
the k-propagating-dealer condition.
Definition 2 (m-propagating-dealer): A graph with (n + 1) nodes (the dealer and n participants) satisfies the
m-propagating-dealer condition for a positive integer m if there exists an ordering of the n participants in the graph
such that every node either has an incoming edge directly from the dealer or has incoming edges from at least m
nodes preceding it in the ordering.
As an illustration of the m-propagating-dealer condition, consider the network of Example 1 (Fig. 1b). This
network satisfies the 2-propagating-dealer condition, with the ordering 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (observe that this is also the
order in which the participants receive their shares under SNEAK as shown in Fig. 2b).
We enumerate below examples of a few classes of graphs that satisfy the m-propagating dealer condition.
Fig. 3 depicts three examples of graphs that satisfy the 3-propagating dealer condition. These examples can be
generalized to the following classes of graphs. The first three classes consider undirected graphs and permit any of
the nodes to be the dealer.
(a) Layered networks (Fig. 3a): Each layer contains at least m nodes, and each node is connected to all nodes in
the neighbouring layers. An ordering that satisfies the m-propagating-dealer condition is the ordering of the nodes
with respect to the distance (in terms of number of hops) from the dealer.
(b) Networks with a backbone (Fig. 3b): A subset of nodes, termed the ‘backbone’, form a densely connected
subgraph (that satisfies the m-propagating-dealer condition), and every node outside the backbone is connected
directly to at least m nodes in the backbone. An ordering that satisfies the m-propagating-dealer condition is: the
ordering under the backbone subgraph, followed by all remaining nodes not in the backbone in any order.
(c) m-connected one-dimensional geometric networks (Fig. 3c): A one-dimensional geometric network is formed
by arranging the nodes (in an arbitrary fashion) along a line, and connecting a pair of nodes by an edge if the
distance (number of hops) between is smaller than a fixed threshold. A one-dimensional geometric network that
satisfies the m-connected-dealer condition also satisfies the m-propagating dealer condition. In this case, an ordering
that satisfies the m-propagating-dealer condition is the arrangement of the nodes in an ascending order of their
euclidean distance from the dealer.
(d) Directed acyclic graphs: Any directed acyclic graph that satisfies the m-connected-dealer condition also
satisfies the m-propagating-dealer condition. The root must be the dealer, and any topological ordering of the DAG
suffices as the requisite node-ordering. E.g., the directed version of the graph of Fig. 1b, with the edges directed
from the left to the right, falls in this class.
6We note that while the necessity of the k-propagating-dealer condition under SNEAK requires the existence of
some such ordering of the nodes, the execution of the algorithm is completely distributed and oblivious to the actual
ordering. We also note that while SNEAK requires the graph to satisfy the k-propagating dealer condition, it is
robust to the network topology, i.e., it satisfies the (k− 1)-collusion-resistance property over any arbitrary network
topology. This robustness property is important since the secrecy of the secret is paramount, and in practice, the
structure of the network may not be known beforehand. Moreover, under a dynamic network, the graph structure
may also vary with time (even during the execution of the algorithm), thus further motivating robustness.
Apart from the parameters n and k, an additional parameter “d” is associated to SNEAK. We saw earlier that the
k-connected-dealer condition is necessary for any secret sharing algorithm, and SNEAK requires the k-propagating-
dealer condition to be satisfied. Now, assuming that these necessary conditions have been met, one would intuitively
expect the efficiency of the algorithm to be higher if the graph has a higher connectivity. The parameter d captures
this intuition: SNEAK takes the parameter d (≥ k) as input, and under the assumption that the graph satisfies the
d-propagating-dealer condition, achieves a greater communication efficiency.
C. Summary of Results
This paper presents a distributed algorithm, called SNEAK, that takes parameters n, k and d (≥ k) as input,
and enables a dealer to disseminate shares of a secret to n participants forming a general network G, such that the
properties of (i) k-secret-recovery (when G satisfies the d-propagating-dealer condition), and (ii) (k− 1)-collusion-
resistance (irrespective of the network topology) are satisfied. The algorithm is completely distributed and each
node needs to know only the identities of its neighbours, and it is efficient with respect to the communication cost
and the amount of randomness required.
For any (n, k) and any graph G with (n+1) nodes, we derive and compare (a) information-theoretic lower bounds
on the total communication cost under any algorithm, (b) lower bounds on the communication cost under the SMT-
based solution, and (c) communication cost under SNEAK. Using these results, we establish the communication
efficiency of SNEAK. SNEAK has particularly useful implications on bounded degree graphs.2 For networks with
bounded degree and satisfying the k-propagating-dealer condition, the communication cost of SNEAK is within a
constant (multiplicative) factor of the information-theoretic lower bound, and is Θ(n) in the worst-case. In contrast,
the communication-cost of the SMT-based solution is lower bounded as Ω(n log n), and is Ω(n2) in the worst case.
Moreover, the amount of randomness required under SNEAK is Θ(1), while that required under the SMT-based
solution is Θ(n).
Appendix C presents three heuristic techniques to extend SNEAK algorithm to networks where the k-propagating-
dealer condition is not satisfied. Appendix C also contains an extension of the algorithm to handle active adversaries,
and an extension to support two-threshold secret sharing.
D. Notational Conventions
A vector will be treated as a column vector by default, and a row vector will be written as the transpose of the
corresponding column vector. The transpose of a vector or a matrix will be denoted by a superscript T . For any
integer ` ≥ 1, [`] will represent the set {1, . . . , `}. For any participant j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), the set of its neighbours
will be denoted by N (j). In case of a directed graph, N (j) will denote the set of nodes to which node j has an
outgoing edge. The dealer will be denoted as D, and the set of neighbours of the dealer by N (D). We will say
that a node j is directly connected to the dealer if j ∈ N (D).
2Bounded degree graphs have their maximum degree upper bounded by a constant that is independent of n.
7III. RELATED LITERATURE
A. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Protocol
We first give a brief review of Shamir’s secret sharing protocol [2]. To this end, we assume that the dealer has
a direct (secure) communication link with every participant (as in the example in Fig. 1a).
Assume that the secret s is drawn from some finite field Fq of size q (> n). The dealer chooses (k − 1) values
{ri}k−1i=1 independently and uniformly at random from Fq. Define a k-length vector m as 3
mT = [s r1 r2 · · · rk−1] . (1)
Next, define a set of n vectors {ψi}ni=1, each of length k, as
ψTi = [1 i i
2 · · · ik−1] . (2)
The share ti of participant i is simply the inner product
ti = ψ
T
i m . (3)
It can be verified that the vectors {ψi}i∈I are all linearly independent. It follows that for any set I ⊆ [n] of
cardinality k, the secret s can be recovered from the set of values {ψTi m}i∈I . Furthermore, it can also be verified
that for any set I ′ ⊆ [n] of cardinality smaller than k, the set {ψTi m}i∈I′ provides no knowledge about s.
Under the assumption that the dealer has direct communication links with each of the n participants, the dealer
can simply pass ti to participant i (∈ [n]).
Remark 1: To see the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in the conventional polynomial representation [2], note that
each share ti can be seen as an evaluation of the (k−1) degree polynomial with the secret s as its constant term and
the remaining (k − 1) coefficients chosen uniformly at random and independent of the secret. Thus, k evaluations
are necessary and sufficient to recover the polynomial and hence the secret. This provides the k-secret-recovery
and (k − 1)-collusion-resistance properties.
This completes the description of Shamir’s secret sharing protocol. There are numerous other extensions and
generalizations of Shamir’s secret sharing protocol in the literature, and the reader is referred to [16], [17] and
references therein for more details. We now describe the SMT-based solution that addresses the situation when the
dealer and participants form a general communication network.
B. The SMT-based solution
This section describes a scheme for secret sharing over a general communication network employing secure
message transmissions from dealer to each participant [15]. Fig. 2a in Example 1 is an example of such a solution.
Under this solution, the dealer first encodes the secret s into n shares {t`}n`=1 using Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme (3). The size q of the underlying finite field Fq is assumed to be greater than n. To every node ` directly
connected to the dealer, the dealer directly passes its share t`. To disseminate shares to the remaining nodes, the
dealer performs the following actions, once separately for each remaining node. Let ` now denote a node that is
not connected directly to the dealer. The dealer applies Shamir’s secret sharing scheme treating t` as a secret, and
computes k shares {u`,j}kj=1, as
u`,j = [1 j j
2 · · · jk−1] [t` r`,1 r`,2 · · · r`,k−1]T , (4)
where the values {r`,1, . . . , r`,k−1} are chosen independently and uniformly at random from Fq. The dealer then
finds k node-disjoint paths (from itself) to node `, and passes u`,j along the jth path (1 ≤ j ≤ k). At the end of
3To suit the description of the algorithm developed subsequently in this paper, we present a matrix-based representation for Shamir’s
protocol instead of the customary polynomial based representation. We will remark upon the connection between the two representations in
the end.
8these transmissions, node ` receives {u`,j}kj=1 from which it can recover its share t`. Moreover, since each of the
random values are independent, no participant can obtain any information about any other participant’s share, or
any additional information about the secret s. This process is repeated once for every node that is not connected
directly to the dealer.
The solution described above requires transmission of data across k node-disjoint paths once separately for every
node that is not connected directly to the dealer. Thus this solution is not distributed, and furthermore is not efficient
in terms of communication and the randomness cost.
We note that the communication efficiency of this solution can be improved if more than k node-disjoint paths
are available, by employing two-threshold secret sharing [18] over these node-disjoint paths. Under this setting, for
any given participant i, let us suppose there are wi (≥ k) node-disjoint paths from the dealer to node i. The dealer
chooses a value w (∈ {k, . . . , wi}), encodes the share of participant i into w chunks in a manner [18] that satisfies
w-secret-recovery and (k−1)-collusion-resistance, and passes these chunks via the w shortest node-disjoint paths to
participant i. The dealer chooses w such that the amount of communication in transmitting the share to participant
i is minimized; the special case of choosing w = k for all participants is equivalent to the procedure described
in the previous paragraphs. The analysis and comparisons performed subsequently in Section V will consider this
more efficient two-threshold version of the SMT-based solution.
C. Network Coding and Distributed Storage
The problem of secret sharing over a general communication network can also be cast as a specific instance of a
network coding problem [19], requiring security from eavesdropping on the nodes. This casting can be performed
in the following manner. The dealer is the source node, and the secret s is the message. The network graph in
the network coding problem is identical to that in the secret sharing problem, but with a set of
(
n
k
)
additional
nodes that act as the sinks. Each of the
(
n
k
)
sinks is connected to a distinct subset of k participants, and has one
directed link of infinite capacity coming in from each of the corresponding k participants. Each sink must recover
the entire message: this requirement corresponds to the condition of k-secret-recovery. To satisfy the (k − 1)-
collusion-resistance property, a compromise of upto (k− 1) arbitrary nodes (excluding the source and the sinks) to
a passive eavesdropper should reveal no information about the message. In this manner, the secret sharing problem
is equivalent to a network coding problem requiring secrecy from an eavesdropper that can gain access to a subset
of the nodes. However, with respect to this setting, very little appears to be known in the network coding literature.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on secure network coding (e.g., [20]–[23]) considers the setting where
the eavesdropper gains access to a subset of the links. The problem of node compromise is typically treated as a case
of link compromise by allowing the eavesdropper to gain access to all links that are incident upon the compromised
nodes. In [22], [23], authors consider the setting wherein a collection of subsets of the links is specified, and an
eavesdropper may gain access to precisely one of these subsets. However, the scheme requires the knowledge of the
network topology, and is computationally expensive. Moreover, the scheme requires the graph to satisfy a particular
condition, which is almost always violated in our problem setting. Communication-efficient algorithms to secure a
network from an eavesdropper having access to a bounded number of links are provided in [20], [21]. Given the
network topology, the actions to be performed at the nodes can be derived in a computationally efficient manner.
However, these algorithms communicate a message of size equal to the difference between the largest message that
can be sent in the absence of secrecy requirements, and the bound on number of compromised links. Under our
problem setting, this difference is generally zero or smaller (e.g., the difference is −2 in the network of Fig. 1b),
thus rendering these algorithms inapplicable.
The SNEAK algorithm constructed in the present paper thus turns out to be an instance of a secure network coding
problem that admits an explicit solution that is distributed, communication efficient, and provides deterministic
(probability 1) guarantees. Furthermore, the solution handles the case of nodal eavesdropping, about which very
little appears to be known in the literature.
SNEAK is based on a variant of the Product-Matrix codes [24] which were originally constructed for distributed
9storage systems. These codes possess useful properties that SNEAK exploits in the present context. The product-
matrix codes are a practical realization of the concept of ‘Regenerating codes’ [25] proposed for distributed storage.
To date, apart from the MDS codes of [26], these are the only known constructions of regenerating codes that are
scalable (i.e., other parameters of the system impose no constraints on the total number of nodes in the system). It
turns out that this scalability property is an essential ingredient for our problem. Secure versions of the product-
matrix codes were constructed in [27], [28]. The reader familiar with the literature on regenerating codes for
distributed storage may recognize later in the paper that we employ the minimum-bandwidth (MBR) version, and
not the minimum-storage (MSR) version, of the product-matrix codes [24]. We make this choice to guarantee
secrecy from honest-but-curious participants, who may store all the data that they receive, a characteristic of the
MBR point on the storage-bandwidth tradeoff [25].
IV. ALGORITHM FOR SECRET SHARING OVER GENERAL NETWORKS
This section presents the main result of the paper. Consider a network G that obeys the d-propagating-dealer
condition for some parameter d (≥ k). The secret s belongs to the alphabet A, and we assume that A = Fd−k+1q ,
for any arbitrary field size q > n. Thus we can equivalently denote the secret as a vector s = [s1 s2 · · · sd−k+1]T
with each element of this vector belonging to the finite field Fq.
A. Initial Setting up by the Dealer
The dealer first constructs an (n× d) Vandermonde matrix Ψ, with the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) row of Ψ being
ψi = [1 i i
2 · · · id−1]T . (5)
The vector ψi is termed the encoding vector of node i.
Next, the dealer constructs a (d× d) symmetric matrix M comprising the secret s and a collection of randomly
generated values as follows:
M =
 sA raT sBTra Rb RTc
sB Rc 0
 (6)
︸︷︷︸
1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−k︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
where the depicted sub-matrices of M are
• sA = sd−k+1 is a scalar,
• sB = [s1 · · · sd−k]T is a vector of length (d− k),
• ra is a vector of length (k − 1) with its entries populated by random values,
• Rb is a ((k − 1)× (k − 1)) symmetric matrix with its k(k−1)2 distinct entries populated by random values,
• Rc is a ((d− k)× (k − 1)) matrix with its (k − 1)(d− k) entries populated by random values.
These random values are all picked independently and uniformly from Fq. Note that the total number of random
values R in matrix M is
R = (k − 1) + k(k − 1)
2
+ (k − 1)(d− k)
= (k − 1)d−
(
k − 1
2
)
. (7)
The entire secret is contained in the components sA and sB as sT = [s1 · · · sd−k+1] = [sBT sA].
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Observe that the structure of M as described in (6), along with the symmetry of matrix Rb, makes the matrix
M symmetric.
The share tj for participant j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) is a vector of length (d− k + 1):
tTj = ψ
T
j
 sA sBTra RTc
sB 0
 . (8)
We will show subsequently in Theorem 3 that any k of these shares suffice to recover the entire secret.
Remark 2: To see these shares in the conventional polynomial representation of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme,
recall that the vector ψTj is drawn from a Vandermonde matrix. Thus each entry of tj in (8) can be seen as the
evaluation of a polynomial at value j. Thus there is one polynomial for each secret value si (1 ≤ i ≤ d− k + 1),
with the corresponding secret symbol as its constant term and the remaining coefficients independent of the secret
value si.
Example 2: Consider the setting of Example 1 (Fig. 2b) where n = 6, k = 2, d = 2. Here
M =
[
s r
r ra
]
,
and for every j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), ψTj = [1 j] and the share for participant j is tTj = [s+ jr].
B. Communication across the Network
Algorithm 1 describes the communication protocol to securely transmit the shares {tj}nj=1 to the n participants.
Algorithm 1 Communication Protocol
Dealer: For every j ∈ N (D), compute and pass the d-length vector ψTj M to participant j.
Participant ` ∈ N (D): Wait until receipt of data ψT`M from the dealer. Upon receipt, perform the following
actions. For every j ∈ N (`), compute the inner product of the data ψT`M with the encoding vector ψj of
participant j. Transmit the resulting value ψT`Mψj to participant j.
Participant ` /∈ N (D): Wait until receipt of one value each from any d neighbours, and then perform the
following actions (if more than d neighbours pass data, retain data from some arbitrary d of these nodes).
Denote this set of d neighbours as {i1, . . . , id}, and the values received from them as {σ1, . . . , σd} respectively.
Compute the vector
v =
 ψ
T
i1
...
ψTid

−1  σ1...
σd
 .
For every neighbour i ∈ N (`) from whom you did not receive data, compute and pass the inner product vTψi
to participant i.
Remark 3: In order to reduce the communication cost, one would like to ensure that a participant receives data
from no more than d of its neighbours. This can be ensured via a simple handshaking protocol between neighbours,
wherein a participant who is ready to transmit data to its neighbours, queries the neighbours for the requirement
of the respective transmissions, prior to actually sending the data.
Example 3: Consider the setting of Example 1 (Fig. 2b), wherein n = 6, k = 2, d = 2. The values of M , ψj
and tj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) under this setting are specified in Example 2. For the given network, we have N (D) = {1, 2}.
As per Algorithm 1, participant j ∈ {1, 2} receives ψTj M = [s + jr r + jra] directly from the dealer. Now
let us focus on participant 3. Since participant 3 is a neighbour to participants 1 and 2, following Algorithm 1,
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participant j ∈ {1, 2} passes ψTj Mψ3 = (s + jr) + 3(r + jra) to participant 3. Participant 3 thus receives the
two values σ1 = (s + r) + 3(r + ra) and σ2 = (s + 2r) + 3(r + 2ra) from neighbours i1 = 1 and i2 = 2. Using
the fact that ψT1 = [1 1] and ψ
T
2 = [1 2], it computes
v =
[
1 1
1 2
]−1 [
(s+ r) + 3(r + ra)
(s+ 2r) + 3(r + 2ra)
]
=
[
s+ 3r
r + 3ra
]
.
A similar procedure is executed at participants 4, 5 and 6 as well.
C. Correctness of the Algorithm
The following theorems show that each participant indeed receives its intended share (8), and the algorithm
satisfies the properties of k-secret-recovery, and (k−1)-collusion-resistance, and that the (k−1)-collusion-resistance
property is also robust to network structure.
Theorem 2 (Successful share dissemination): Under the algorithm presented, every participant ` ∈ [n] can re-
cover ψT`M , and hence obtain its intended share
tT` = ψ
T
`
 sA sBTra RTc
sB 0
 .
Proof: Recall that the graph satisfies the d-dealer propagation condition. Let us assume without loss of generality
that the ordering of nodes satisfying this condition is 1, . . . , n. It follows that the first d nodes in this ordering
must be connected directly to the dealer. The proof proceeds via induction. The induction hypothesis is as follows:
every participant ` can recover the data ψT`M , and if ` passes any data to any other node j ∈ N (`) then this data
is precisely the value ψT`Mψj .
Consider the base case of node 1. Since this node is directly connected to the dealer, it receives the data ψT1M
from the dealer. Moreover, following the communication protocol, it passes ψT1Mψj to each neighbour j ∈ N (1).
Let us now assume that the hypothesis holds true for the first (` − 1) nodes in the ordering. If node ` is directly
connected to the dealer, then the hypothesis is satisfied for this node by an argument identical to the case of node
1. Suppose ` is not directly connected to the dealer. It follows that node ` must be connected to at least d other
nodes preceding it in the ordering, and furthermore, must receive data from at least d of these nodes (say, nodes
{j1, . . . , jd} ⊆ [` − 1]). By our hypothesis, these d nodes pass the d values {ψTj1Mψ`, . . . ,ψTjdMψ`}. It follows
that the algorithm running at node ` operates on the input σ1...
σd
 =
 ψ
T
j1
...
ψTjd
Mψ` . (9)
By construction, the matrix in (9) with ψTj1 , . . . ,ψ
T
jd as its rows is a (d × d) Vandermonde matrix, and is hence
invertible. Thus, the computation of v as described in Algorithm 1 can be performed efficiently using standard
Reed-Solomon decoding algorithms [29], [30]. It further follows that v = Mψ`, and since M is a symmetric
matrix, we get vT = ψT`M
T = ψT`M . Finally, the data passed by node ` to any other node i ∈ N (`), according
to the protocol, is vTψi = ψ
T
`Mψi. This proves the hypothesis for node `.
Due to the specific structure (6) of M , the desired share t` is a subset of the elements of the vector ψT`M . Thus,
every participant obtains its intended share.
Theorem 3 (k-secret-recovery): Any k shares suffice to recover the secret.
Proof: Let I ⊆ [n] denote the set of the k participants attempting to recover the secret. Let ΨI be a (k × d)
matrix with its k rows comprising {ψTi }i∈I . Further, let Ψ˜I denote the (k × k) submatrix of ΨI comprising the
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first k columns of ΨI . Observe that the k participants in I collectively have access to the data
ΨI
 sA sBTra RTc
sB 0
 .
Consider the last (d− k) columns of this data, i.e.,
ΨI
 sBTRTc
0
 = Ψ˜I [ sBTRTc
]
.
Since ΨI is a (k × d) Vandermonde matrix, it follows that Ψ˜I is a (k × k) Vandermonde matrix. Thus, Ψ˜I is
invertible. This allows for the decoding of sB (via algorithms [29], [30] identical to those for decoding under
Shamir’s original secret sharing scheme). It now remains to recover sA, and to this end consider the first column
of the data, i.e.,
ΨI
 sAra
sB
 .
Since the value of sB is now known, its effect can be subtracted from this data to obtain
ΨI
 sAra
0
 = Ψ˜I [ sAra
]
.
Since Ψ˜I is invertible, the value of sA can be decoded from this data.
Theorem 4 ((k − 1)-collusion-resistance and robustness): Any set of (k−1) or fewer colluding participants can
gain no information about the secret. This guarantee is robust to network topology, i.e., holds for arbitrary graphs.
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 4: In certain scenarios, the communication network topology may be known beforehand, and it may
be desired to verify whether the topology satisfies the d-propagating-dealer condition. This task can be performed
efficiently by simply simulating the communication protocol of SNEAK (Algorithm 1) on the given network: the
d-propagating dealer condition is satisfied if and only if all nodes receive data from at least d other nodes.
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND BOUNDS
In this section, we provide an analysis and comparison of the complexity of SNEAK, the SMT-based solution,
and lower bounds for any secret-sharing scheme.
Recall that D denotes the dealer and N (D) denotes the set of neighbours of the dealer (or, in case of directed
edges, the set of nodes with edges coming in from the dealer). Let |N (D)| denote the size of this set. We assume
without loss of generality that the units of data are normalized with one unit defined to be equal to the size of
the secret. We will use the notation Γ(.) to denote communication cost, and ρ(.) to denote amount of randomness
required. The proofs of each of the results stated below are available in Appendix B.
A. Communication Cost and Randomness Required
Theorem 5: For an (n, k) secret sharing problem on any graph G with (n+1) nodes satisfying the d-propagating-
dealer condition for some (known) d, SNEAK
(a) requires every node to receive dd−k+1 units of data, and hence requires a total communication of
ΓSNEAK(G) = n d
d− k + 1 (10)
13
units of data, and
(b) requires an amount of randomness given by
ρSNEAK(G) = (k − 1)(2d− k)
2(d− k + 1) . (11)
Theorem 6: For an (n, k) secret sharing problem on any graph G with (n+ 1) nodes, the SMT-based solution
(a) requires a total communication of
ΓSMT(G) = |N (D)|+
∑
i/∈N (D)
min
w≥k
[
w
w − k + 1 × `w(D → i)
]
(12)
units of data, where `w(D → i) is the average of the path lengths of the w shortest node-disjoint paths from the
dealer to node i (with `w(D → i) =∞ if there do not exist w node-disjoint paths from D to i), and
(b) requires an amount of randomness lower bounded by
ρSMT(G) ≥ k − 1 +
∑
i/∈N (D)
k − 1
wmax(i)− k + 1 (13)
≥ (n− |N (D)|) (k − 1)|N (D)| − (k − 1) (14)
where wmax(i) is the maximum number of node-disjoint paths from the dealer to node i.
Remark 5: The lower bound on the randomness requirement of the SMT-based solution provided in (13) is
achievable, however, at the cost of an increased communication cost (the communication cost will be higher than
that specified in (12), wherein the optimal w chosen for every term inside the summation would be replaced by
wmax(i)).
From the two theorems stated above, we can see that SNEAK provides the greatest gains over the SMT-based
solution when the distance in the graph between the dealer and the participants is large on an average.
The following theorem provides information-theoretic lower bounds under any scheme on the amount of com-
munication and the amount of randomness required, which serves as a benchmark to compare SNEAK and the
SMT-based solution.
Theorem 7: For an (n, k) secret sharing problem on any graph G with (n+ 1) nodes under any algorithm,
(a) any node ` ∈ [n] must receive at least
Γevery(`) ≥

deg(`)
deg(`)−k+1 if ` /∈ N (D) and deg(`) ≥ k
1 if ` ∈ N (D)
∞ if ` /∈ N (D) and deg(`) < k
(15)
units of data, where deg(`) denotes the number of incoming edges at node `. Furthermore, this bound is the best
possible, given only the identities of the neighbours of node `. Hence the total communication cost under any
algorithm is lower bounded by
Γany(G) ≥ |N (D)|+
∑
i/∈N (D)
deg(i)
deg(i)− k + 1 , (16)
≥ n (17)
and
(b) the amount of randomness required under any algorithm is lower bounded [31] by
ρany(G) ≥ k − 1 . (18)
Remark 6: The lower bound (17) can be deduced alternatively from the fact that the share of each participant
must be atleast the size of the secret [Theorem 1, [32]].
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B. Implications for the Case of Bounded Degree Graphs
The SNEAK algorithm has particularly striking implications on secret sharing on graphs whose maximum degree
is bounded (independent of n), for example, in the graph depicted in Fig. 3a with the nodes partitioned into ‘layers’
of three nodes each.
As discussed earlier, for any secret sharing algorithm to succeed, the graph must satisfy the d-connected-dealer
condition for some d ≥ k. Now, if a graph satisfies the d-connected-dealer (or the stronger d-propagating-dealer)
condition, the value of d must be upper bounded by the maximum degree of the graph. It follows that the parameters
k and d are upper bounded by the maximum degree of the graph, and are therefore independent of n. Theorem 12
and Theorem 13 present the main results for this setting.
Lemma 8: For any given (n, k), and for any given d (k ≤ d < n), consider any undirected graph with (n+ 1)
nodes such that (a) every non-neighbour of D has a degree of d, and (b) the graph satisfies the d-propagating-
dealer condition. Under SNEAK, the amount of data received by any node ` /∈ N (D) meets the lower bound (15).
Furthermore, under SNEAK, the amount of data received by any node ` ∈ N (D) is independent of n.
Lemma 9: For any given (n, k), and for any given d (k ≤ d < n), there exists a class of graphs such that the
communication cost on graphs belonging to this class is lower bounded by
Γany(G) ≥ n d
d− k + 1 − (k − 1)
d
d− k + 1 . (19)
Thus, for the class of graphs considered in Lemma 9, the communication cost of SNEAK (10) is within a constant
(additive) factor of the lower bound.
The following two lemmas quantify the performance of the SMT-based solution. Lemma 10 is more general than
that of bounded degree graphs considered in this section: the lemma also applies to graphs whose maximum degree
may grow with n.
Lemma 10: On graphs with the maximum outgoing degree O((logn)
1
2
−)) for some  > 0, the SMT-based
solution requires a super-linear communication cost. Furthermore, for graphs with degree bounded by a constant
independent of n, the SMT-based solution requires an Ω(n log n) communication cost.
Lemma 11: For any given (n, k), and for any given d (k ≤ d < n), there exists a class of graphs with (n+ 1)
nodes such that each graph in this class satisfies the d-propagating dealer condition, and (n, k) secret sharing on
any graph G in this class using the SMT-based solution requires a communication cost lower bounded by
ΓSMT(G) ≥ n(n+ 1)
4d
. (20)
The following theorem gives a comparison between the SMT-based solution, SNEAK and the lower bounds.
Theorem 12: Consider graphs that satisfy the k-propagating-dealer condition and have their maximum degree
upper bounded by a constant independent of n. The the communication cost of SNEAK is within a constant
(multiplicative) factor of the information-theoretic lower bound, and is Θ(n) in the worst-case. On the other hand,
the communication cost of SMT-based solution is Ω(n log n), and is Ω(n2) in the worst case.
The following result quantifies the amount of randomness required for secret sharing under the SMT-based
solution and SNEAK.
Theorem 13: Consider graphs that satisfy the k-propagating-dealer condition and have their maximum degree
upper bounded by a constant independent of n. The amount of randomness required under the SMT-based solution
is Θ(n), and the amount of randomness required under SNEAK is Θ(1).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Many cryptographic protocols in the literature require execution of one or more instances of secret sharing
among all the participants. Most of these protocols assume that the dealer has direct communication links to all the
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participants. This paper presents SNEAK, a distributed and efficient algorithm for secret sharing in a setting where
the dealer and the participants form a general communication network. While SNEAK requires the network to satisfy
the stronger k-propagating-dealer condition as opposed to the k-connected-dealer condition required by the existing
methods, it provides significant reduction in the communication cost and the amount of randomness required, in
addition to being distributed. The paper also presents information-theoretic lower bounds on the communication
cost for secret sharing in general networks, which may be of independent interest.
The upper and lower bounds on the communication cost for secret sharing presented in this paper are shown
to be tight for certain classes of networks. However, obtaining (tight) bounds on the communication cost for
general networks still remains open. SNEAK requires the network to satisfy the k-propagating dealer condition,
and only heuristics are known to address networks that satisfy the k-connected-dealer but not the k-propagating-
dealer condition. Designing more efficient algorithms and quantifying the communication requirements for such
settings remain open.
Finally, the results of this paper turn out to be an instance of a network coding problem that interestingly admits
an explicit solution that is distributed, communication efficient, and provides probability 1 guarantees. Moreover,
the solution handles the case of nodal eavesdropping, about which very little appears to be known in the literature.
As a part of future work, we wish to investigate if any of the ideas from this specific case of secure network coding
carry over to more general network coding problems.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (k − 1)-COLLUSION-RESISTANCE
Proof of Theorem 4: This proof follows on the lines of the proof of [27, Theorem 1]. Consider execution of
SNEAK on a network having an arbitrary topology. Let J ⊂ [n] denote the set of (k− 1) participants colluding in
an attempt to recover information about the secret s. Denote the number of secret values (over Fq) by S = d−k+1.
Further, let r denote the collection of (from (7)) R = (k − 1)d− (k−12 ) random values introduced initially by the
dealer.
The data obtained by any participant j ∈ J is a subset of the values ψTj M and {ψT` Mψj}`∈[n]. This is true under
any arbitrary topology, and irrespective of the connectivity of node j. Furthermore, since matrix M is symmetric,
{ψT` Mψj}`∈[n] = {ψTj Mψ`}`∈[n]. Thus, participant j obtains at most the d-length vector ψTj M under the execution
of the protocol.
It suffices to consider the worst case wherein every node j ∈ J obtains ψTj M completely. Let ΨJ be the
((k− 1)×d) submatrix of Ψ comprising the (k− 1) vectors {ψTj }j∈J as its rows. Under this notation, the (k− 1)
colluding participants together have access to at most the (k − 1)d values
CJ = ΨJM = ΨJ
 sA raT sBTra Rb RTc
sB Rc 0
 .
Let e denote the set of these (k − 1)d values.
Throughout the proof, we will use the function H(.) to denote the Shannon entropy. All logarithms in the
computation of the entropy functions are assumed to be taken to the base q.
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As an intermediate step in the proof, we will show that given all the secret values s as side-information, the
(k − 1) colluding participants can recover all the R random values, i.e., we will show that H(r|e, s) = 0. To this
end, observe that since the code is linear, if the secret values sA and sB are known to the colluding participants,
they can subtract the components of sA and sB from CJ , to obtain
C
′
J = ΨJ
 0 raT 0Tra Rb RTc
0 Rc 0
 .
Since ΨJ is a ((k−1)×d) Vandermonde matrix with all non-zero entries, when restricted to columns 2 to (k−1),
it forms a ((k−1)×(k−1)) invertible matrix. This allows recovery of the random values in ra and Rc. Subtracting
the components of these decoded values gives
C
′′
J = ΨJ
 0 0T 0T0 Rb 0T
0 0 0
 ,
and in a manner identical to that of decoding ra and Rc, the colluding participants can decode the remaining
random values Rb. Thus, given the secret values, the (k − 1) colluding participants can decode all the random
values, which implies
H(r|e, s) = 0 . (21)
As another intermediate step in the proof, we will now show that all but R of the values obtained by the (k− 1)
participants are functions of the other values that they possess, i.e., H(e) ≤ R. From the value of R in (7), it
suffices to show that out of the (k − 1)d values that the colluding participants have access to, (k−12 ) of them are
functions (in particular, linear combinations) of the rest. Consider the ((k − 1)× (k − 1)) matrix
CJΨTJ = ΨJMΨ
T
J . (22)
Since M is symmetric, this ((k− 1)× (k− 1)) matrix in (22) is also symmetric. Thus (k−12 ) dependencies among
the elements of CJ are described by the
(
k−1
2
)
upper-triangular elements of the expression
CJΨTJ −ΨJCTJ = 0 . (23)
Since the rows of ΨJ are linearly independent, these
(
k−1
2
)
redundant equations are independent. Thus the colluding
participants have access to at most (k − 1)d− (k−12 ) independent values, which equals the value of R, and hence
H(e) ≤ R. (24)
We finally show that the two conditions (21) and (24) above must necessarily imply that the mutual information
between the secret values and the values obtained by the colluding participants I(s; e) = 0 is zero.
I(s; e) = H(e)−H(e|s) (25)
≤ R−H(e|s) (26)
= R−H(e|s) +H(e|s, r) (27)
= R− I(e; r|s) (28)
= R− (H(r|s)−H(r|e, s)) (29)
= R−H(r|s) (30)
= R−R (31)
= 0 , (32)
where (26) follows from (24); (27) follows since every value in the system is a function of s and r, giving
H(e|s, r) = 0; (30) follows from (21); and (31) follows since the random values are independent of the secret
values. Thus, s and e are independent random variables.
The (k− 1)-collusion-resistance property is thus satisfied under any arbitrary topology of the network (that may
even vary with time), making SNEAK robust to the network topology.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Proof of Theorem 5: Under SNEAK, each participant who is directly connected to the dealer receives d values
(over Fq) and each of the other participant receives exactly one value each from d of its neighbours. Thus, the total
amount of data received by each participant is d values. Normalizing this by the size of the secret, which under
SNEAK is (d− k + 1), gives the desired result (10).
Under SNEAK, the size of the secret is (d−k+ 1) values over Fq. From the description of the algorithm (7) we
see that the total randomness required is
(
(k − 1)d− (k−12 )) values over Fq. Normalizing this value by the size
of the secret gives the desired result (11).
Proof of Theorem 6: Under the SMT-based solution, the dealer first computes the (unit-sized) shares {ti}ni=1
of each of the nodes. To every node in N (D), the dealer directly passes its respective share, thus resulting in a total
communication of |N (D)| units of data. Now consider any other node i /∈ N (D). Suppose there exist w (≥ k)
node-disjoint paths from the dealer to node i. The dealer treats ti as a secret and uses two-level secret sharing to
construct w shares such that no (k− 1) of these shares reveal any information about ti, and all w shares suffice to
recover ti completely. Under this encoding, the size of each of the w shares is 1w−k+1 . The dealer then passes these
w shares along the w node-disjoint paths to node i, and node i thus securely obtains ti. Thus, if we let `w(D → i)
denote the average of the lengths of these w paths, the communication required is ww−k+1`w(D → i) units of data.
The dealer is free to choose the value of w across all feasible options, that minimizes this expression, thus leading
to the result (12).
Under the SMT-based solution, the dealer first constructs the n shares using (k− 1) random values. In addition,
in order to disseminate the shares to any node i /∈ N (D), the dealer can perform a two-level secret sharing and
pass the shares across w node-disjoint paths as described above. This requires k−1w−k+1 units of randomness, which
is minimized when w = wmax. This leads to the result (13).
For any graph G the maximum number of node-disjoint paths from the dealer to any node i is upper bounded
by, wmax(i) ≤ |N (D)|. Using this bound in (13) leads to the result (14).
Proof of Theorem 7: Let S denote the random variable representing the secret, and assume without loss of
generality that its entropy is normalized to unity, i.e.,
H(S) = 1. (33)
Case I (` /∈ N (D) and deg(`) ≥ k): Let z = deg(`) denote the number of incoming edges at node ` (in case of
an undirected graph, z denotes the degree of node `). Let nodes {i1, . . . , iz} be these z neighbours of node `. For
j ∈ {1, . . . , z}, let Wj denote the random variable representing all the data available at node ij , and let Xj denote
the random variable representing the data passed by node ij to node `. We will now show that
H(X1) + · · ·+H(Xz) ≥ z
z − k + 1 , (34)
which suffices to prove the result.
Since Wj is the entire data available at node ij , and Xj is the data passed by node ij , it follows that given Wj ,
the random variable Xj is conditionally independent of all other random variables in the set
{S,X1,W1, . . . , Xj−1,Wj−1, Xj+1,Wj+1, . . . , Xz,Wz}.
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Now, for any permutation {j1, . . . , jz} of {1, . . . , z}, it must be that
H(Xjk) + · · ·+H(Xjz)
≥ H(Xjk , . . . , Xjz)
≥ H(Xjk , . . . , Xjz |Wj1 , . . . ,Wjk−1)
≥ I(S;Xjk , . . . , Xjz |Wj1 , . . . ,Wjk−1)
= H(S|Wj1 , ...,Wjk−1)−H(S|Wj1 , ...,Wjk−1 , Xjk , ..., Xjz)
= 1−H(S|Wj1 , . . . ,Wjk−1 , Xjk , . . . , Xjz) (35)
= 1−H(S|Wj1 , . . . ,Wjk−1 , Xj1 , . . . , Xjz) (36)
= 1. (37)
Here, (35) is a consequence of the fact that any set of (k − 1) nodes cannot contain any information about the
secret S, and that H(S) = 1; (36) is due to the conditional independence conditions described above; (37) arises
due to the requirement of being able to recover the secret S from any k nodes.
Now, let us consider the z cyclic permutations of {1, . . . , z}: {1, . . . , z}, {2, . . . , z, 1}, . . ., {z, 1, . . . , z − 1}.
Setting {j1, . . . , jz} based on each of these permutations one by one, and adding up the resulting z inequalities (37)
we get
(z − k + 1) (H(X1) + · · ·+H(Xz)) ≥ z, (38)
and hence
H(X1) + · · ·+H(Xz) ≥ z
z − k + 1 (39)
is the minimum amount of data required to be received at any node that is not a neighbour of the dealer.
Case II (` ∈ N (D)): Let W` denote the entire data received by node `. Consider a set of some other (k − 1)
nodes, {i1, . . . , ik−1}. Let Wi1 , . . . ,Wik−1 be the data available at these (k − 1) nodes respectively. Then,
H(W`) ≥H(W`|Wi1 , . . . ,Wik−1)
≥ I(S;W`|Wi1 , . . . ,Wik−1)
= H(S|Wi1 , . . . ,Wik−1)−H(S|W`,Wi1 , . . . ,Wik−1)
= 1 (40)
where the final equation arises from the k-secret-recovery and (k − 1)-collusion-resistance properties, and that we
have normalized H(S) = 1. Thus node ` receives at least one unit of data.
Case III (` /∈ N (D) and deg(`) < k): It is clear that in this case, k-connected-dealer condition is not satisfied,
and hence (n, k) secret sharing is not possible. This completes the proof of (15).
We now show that for any (n, k), given only the identities of the neighbours of node `, this lower bound is the
best possible. This is trivially true when ` /∈ N (D) and deg(`) < k, since in this case, the necessary condition
of k-connected-dealer is not satisfied, thus making (n, k) secret sharing on this graph infeasible. We thus focus
on the two remaining cases. Let A ⊆ [n] ∪ {D}\{`} denote the set of nodes that have outgoing edges to node
`, and B ⊆ [n] ∪ {D}\{`} denote the set of nodes which have incoming edges from node ` (if a node shares an
undirected edge with `, it belongs to both the sets). Given the sets A, B, we will construct a graph on (n + 1)
nodes consistent with the information about the neighbours of ` (i.e., the sets A and B), and show that under
SNEAK on this graph, the amount of data required to be received at node ` matches the bound (15) with equality.
Consider a graph on (n+ 1) nodes with the following edge set: an edge from node ` to every node in B, an edge
from every node in A to node `, and an edge from D to each node in [n]\{`}. One can verify that this graph is
consistent with the information provided about the neighbourhood of node `. One can also verify that this graph
satisfies the d-propagating-dealer condition with d = deg(`). In this graph, every node in the set [n]\{`} receives
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its share directly from the dealer. If ` ∈ N (D) (i.e., if D ∈ A), then node ` also receives its share directly from
the dealer. Since the size of the share (8) is equal to the size of the secret, the bound (15) on the amount of data
received is met. When ` /∈ N (D), Theorem 5 shows that under SNEAK with d = deg(`), node ` obtains its share
after receiving exactly deg(`)deg(`)−k+1 units of data. Thus, the lower bound (15) is achieved in this case as well.
The result (16) is an immediate consequence of of the result (15) proved above.
Proof of Lemma 8: Under SNEAK, each node receives
(
d
d−k+1
)
units of data (as shown in Theorem 5).
Since each node ` /∈ N (D) has deg(`) = d, an application of Theorem 7 leads to the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 9: For the given values of n, k and d (k ≤ d < n), consider any directed graph with (n+ 1)
nodes such that (a) the dealer has d outgoing edges, (b) every non-neighbour of D has d incoming edges, and (c)
the graph satisfies d-propagating-dealer condition. Any graph with the above three properties has |N (D)| = d and
deg(i) = d ∀ i /∈ N (D). An application of (16) and a simple rearrangement of the terms leads to the desired
result.
In order to show that the class of graphs considered above is non-empty, we now present a means to construct
graphs with the requisite properties. Consider first, a graph on (n+ 1) nodes (the dealer and n participants) with
no edges. Consider an arbitrary ordering of the n participants as 1, 2, . . . , n. Add edges in the following manner:
• For every i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
– add a directed edge from the dealer to node i
• For every i ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n}
– Pick any arbitrary subset Si of d nodes from the set {1, . . . , i− 1}
– For every j ∈ Si, add a directed edge from node j to node i
This completes the construction of the graph. One can verify that this graph satisfies all the three requisite properties
(with the d-propagating dealer condition satisfied under the ordering 1, 2, . . . , n of the participants).
While the above description provides a general consturction, a concrete example of a graph satisfying the three
properties listed above, is the class of layered graphs as in Fig. 3a with a modification: assume all edges to be
directed from the left to the right, and the existence of an additional ‘dealer’ node that has edges to every node in
the leftmost layer.
Proof of Lemma 10: For any graph Gn with (n+ 1) nodes, let bn be the maximum of the outgoing degrees
of all the nodes in the graph. Since k > 1, we have bn > 1. In (12) from Theorem 6(a), observe that
min
w>k
`w(D → i) ≥ `min(D → i) (41)
where `min(D → i) is the length of the shortest path from the dealer to node i, and that ww−k+1 ≥ 1, ∀w > k.
As a consequence of this, we have
ΓSMT(Gn) ≥ |N (D)|+
∑
i/∈N (D)
`min(D → i) . (42)
Now, since the degree of each node is upper bounded by bn, there can be at most bn nodes that are connected
directly to the dealer, at most b2n nodes with `min(D → i) = 2, at most b3n nodes with `min(D → i) = 3, and so on.
Let
m = arg max m˜ (43)
subject to
 m˜∑
j=1
bjn ≤ n
 ,
and m˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
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It follows from the discussion above that
ΓSMT(Gn) ≥
m∑
j=1
jbjn (44)
≥ mbmn . (45)
One can infer from (43) that m is the largest integer satisfying
bm+1n − bn
bn − 1 ≤ n ,
and hence
m =
⌊
log(n(bn − 1)) + bn
log bn
⌋
− 1
≥ logn
log bn
− 2 . (46)
Substituting this in (45), we obtain
ΓSMT(Gn) ≥
(
logn
log bn
− 2
)
n
b2n
(47)
⇒ ΓSMT(Gn)
n
≥
(
logn
log bn
− 2
)
1
b2n
. (48)
Setting bn = O((logn)
1
2
−)) or bn = O(1) gives the respective desired results.
Proof of Lemma 11: For any given (n, k) and d (k ≤ d < n), consider a parameter a where 0 ≤ a ≤ n.
Construct a graph G with (n + 1) nodes in the following manner. Consider first a graph on (n + 1) nodes (the
dealer and n participants) with no edges. Consider an arbitrary ordering of the n participants as 1, 2, . . . , n. Denote
the delaer as node 0. Add edges in the following manner:
• For every i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
– add a directed edge from the dealer to node i
• For every i ∈ {d+ 1, . . . , n}
– Pick any arbitrary subset Si of d nodes from the set {max(i− (d+ a), 0), . . . , i− 1}
– For every j ∈ Si, add a directed edge from node j to node i
From the construction described above, it is clear that each graph in this class satisfies the d-propagating-dealer
condition (with the requisite ordering of the nodes being 1, . . . , n).
Clearly under this construction, any path from the dealer to any node i requires at least
⌈
i
d+a
⌉
steps. Now, the
expression in the statement of Theorem 6 can be bounded as
ΓSMT(G) ≥ |N (D)|+
∑
i/∈N (D)
`min(D → i) (49)
where `min(D → i) is the length of the shortest path from the dealer to node i. This can be rewritten in the present
context as
ΓSMT(G) ≥
n∑
i=1
⌈
i
d+ a
⌉
(50)
≥ n(n+ 1)
2(d+ a)
. (51)
Setting a = d in (51) leads to the desired result.
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Proof of Theorem 12: A consequence of Proposition 1 is that for a graph having a maximum degree that is
upper bounded by a constant independent of n, the parameters k and d must also be bounded by that constant, and
hence are O(1). The result now follows from Theorem 5(a), Theorem 6(a), Lemma 10, and Lemma 11.
Proof of Theorem 13: From (14) we can see that the amount of randomness required under the SMT-based
solution increases with n unless the number of nodes connected directly to the dealer also increases linearly with n.
A consequence of Proposition 1 is that for a graph having a maximum degree that is upper bounded by a constant
independent of n, the parameters k and d must also be bounded by that constant, and hence are O(1). Furthermore,
since the maximum degree is upper bounded by a constant independent of n, so is the number of neighbours of
the dealer. Then the result follows from Theorem 5 and Theorem 6
APPENDIX C
EXTENSIONS OF THE SNEAK ALGORITHM
A. Two-threshold Secret Sharing Over General Networks
In [18], the authors introduced a modification of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to include two thresholds k
and ` (< k). The modified scheme satisfies the properties of k-secret-recovery and `-collusion-resistance (Shamir’s
original scheme is a special case with ` = k− 1). The relaxation of ` to a value smaller than (k− 1) allows for the
reduction of the size of each share (when normalized by the message size), thus requiring the dealer to transmit a
smaller amount of data, and the participants to store lesser data.
We now generalize the SNEAK algorithm presented in Section IV, for distributed secret sharing across a general
network, to accommodate two thresholds. The generalization only modifies the structure of matrix M in (6) in the
original algorithm. Given two thresholds k and `, the dimensions of the constituent submatrices of M are changed
to
M =
 SA RTa STBRa Rb RTc
SB Rc 0
 (52)
︸︷︷︸
k−`
︸ ︷︷ ︸
`
︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−k︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
where
• SA is a symmetric ((k − `)× (k − `)) matrix containing (k−`)(k−`+1)2 secret values,
• SB is ((d− k)× (k − `)) matrix containing (k − `)(d− k) secret values,
• Ra is a (`× (k − `)) matrix containing `(k − `) random values,
• Rb is a (`× `) symmetric matrix containing `(`+1)2 random values,
• Rc is a ((d− k)× `) matrix containing `(d− k) random values.
Each random or secret value is drawn from the finite field Fq, q > n. Note that M continues to be a (d × d)
symmetric matrix. The remaining algorithm remains the same as in Section IV. The properties of k-secret-recovery,
`-collusion-resistance and robustness to network structure can be verified via arguments analogous to those in
Section IV-C.
B. Handling Active Adversaries
Throughout the paper we assumed a honest-but-curious model, where the participants honestly follow the protocol,
but may gather any available information. Now, we consider the case when some participants may be active
adversaries, i.e., may pass corrupt values to their neighbours (in addition to trying to gather information about the
secret). We show how to modify SNEAK (Section IV) to handle the case when there are upto t active adversaries
in the system, for some given parameter t.
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The modified algorithm requires the network to satisfy a (d + 2t)-propagating-dealer condition; let us assume
this holds. Under the algorithm, the dealer computes the matrix M and the encoding vectors as described in
Section IV. As before, to each participant i directly connected to the dealer, it passes the data ψTi M . The only
modifications are that each participant ` who is not connected to the dealer obtains data from (d+ 2t) neighbours
and that the method of recovering the data ψT`M now involves correcting errors. Let us assume that participant
` receives data form neighbours {j1, . . . , jd+2t}. According to the protocol, this data is the set of (d+ 2t) values
{ψTj1Mψ`, . . . ,ψTjd+2tMψ`}. By construction, any d vectors from the set {ψTj1 , . . . ,ψTjd+2t} are linearly independent.
Thus, the (d+2t) values received by node ` form a Maximum-Distance-Separable (MDS) encoding of the d-length
vector Mψ`. Furthermore, since at most t of the participants may be actively adversarial, no more than t out of
the (d+ 2t) received values can be in error. Thus, participant ` can apply standard Reed-Solomon code decoding
algorithms [29] and recover Mψ` correctly. Finally, since M is symmetric by construction (6), participant `
equivalently obtains its desired data ψT`M . The participant then passes ψ
T
`Mψj to each of its neighbours j.
C. Heuristics for Handling Networks that Do Not Meet the Propagating-dealer Condition
SNEAK requires the graph to satisfy the d-propagating-dealer condition for some known d (≥ k). If a graph
does not satisfy the d-propagating-dealer condition, there will exist a subset of the nodes that will not be able
to recover their respective shares 4. For example, consider (n = 10, k = 2) secret-sharing over the graph shown
in Fig. 4a using SNEAK with parameter d = 2. In this example, the graph does not satisfy 2-propagating-dealer
condition since only one neighbour of node 8 (which is node 5) can recover the data prior to node 8. If SNEAK is
used to disseminate the shares assuming that the graph satisfies 2-propagating dealer condition, nodes 8, 9, and 10
will not be able to recover their shares.
We now present three heuristic ways of extending SNEAK to handle secret sharing over graphs which do not
satisfy the d-propagating-dealer condition, using the graph in Fig. 4a as a working example. We note that while
4Recall that no information will, however, be leaked.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
D
(a)
r
7+
m
78
r7
r7+m78
m
58 , r
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
D
(b)
Fig. 4: (a) An example network that does not satisfy the k-propagating dealer condition for k = 2. Node 8 is a bottleneck
node. (b) Communicating data to the bottleneck node 8: node 7 communicates its message m78 = ((s+7r)+8(r+7ra)) to
node 8 under SNEAK, through the two highlighted node-disjoint paths (r7 is chosen uniformly at random from the field of
operation F11). Node 8 also obtains m58 = ((s+5r)+8(r+5ra)) directly from node 5.
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these heuristics work successfully, the resulting algorithm is no longer completely distributed and a rigorous analysis
of its performance guarantees is open.
a) Heuristic 1: One straightforward approach is to employ the SMT-based solution of separate secure trans-
missions from the dealer to all the nodes that do not receive their respective shares upon an execution of SNEAK.
Using this approach for the example in Fig. 4a, for each of the nodes i ∈ {8, 9, 10}, the dealer communicates the
respective share (s+ ir) over two node-disjoint paths, using the SMT-based solution solution. This requires a total
of 30 units of communication to disseminate shares to these nodes. In general, this approach is inefficient, since
it does not exploit the advantages offered by our distributed algorithm to the fullest extent. This is especially so
when only a few nodes act as bottlenecks hindering the progress of the algorithm as we will see below.
b) Heuristic 2: Observe that in the example network in Fig. 4a there is only one node, node 8, that is the
bottleneck: receipt of its data by node 8 would allow SNEAK to continue further and disseminate shares to the
remaining nodes (9 and 10) efficiently. This leads to a second approach that is more communication efficient,
wherein the SMT-based solution can be employed to communicate data to only the bottleneck nodes. The SMT-
based solution would pass precisely the data that the bottleneck node(s) would possess under SNEAK, after which
SNEAK can be employed to disseminate shares to the remaining nodes. For the example under consideration,
node i ∈ {1, . . . , 7} would have obtained data {s+ ir, r + ira} via SNEAK. Next, the dealer would communicate
{s+ 8r, r + 8ra} to node 8 through the two node-disjoint paths, 1→ 3→ 5→ 8 and 2→ 4→ 6→ 7→ 9→ 8,
and subsequently, nodes 7 and 8 can pass the requisite shares to the remaining nodes 9 and 10. This approach
requires a total of 14 units of communication to disseminate shares to the nodes 8, 9 and 10. Note that the graph
considered in the example had only one bottleneck node, and hence the SMT-based solution was employed only
once. On a general graph, this approach can be iteratively performed (whenever SNEAK hits a bottleneck node)
until all the participants receive their shares. Further note that the dealer can always communicate the data to the
bottleneck nodes since the graph has to necessarily satisfy the k-connected-dealer condition in order to achieve
(n, k) secret sharing.
c) Heuristic 3: Instead of communicating the data to the bottleneck nodes from the dealer, one may alter-
natively use a local version of the SMT-based solution: nodes in the vicinity of the bottleneck nodes, who have
already received their data, pass the requisite data to the bottleneck nodes via node-disjoint paths. The data that
such a node passes to the bottleneck node is precisely what it would have passed had there been a direct edge
between them using the SMT-based solution. This node treats this data as a secret, and uses k-node-disjoint paths
(if available) to communicate this secret to the bottleneck node. To illustrate this approach, consider again the
network depicted in Fig. 4a. Node 8 can directly receive m58 = ((s+ 5r) + 8(r+ 5ra)) from node 5. Now, if node
7 had a direct communication link to node 8, under SNEAK, it would have sent m78 = ((s+ 7r) + 8(r+ 7ra)) to
node 8. In the absence of such an edge, node 7 can securely communicate this data over two node-disjoint paths
as depicted in Fig. 4b. Once node 8 gets this data, SNEAK can proceed and disseminate shares to the remaining
nodes 9 and 10. This approach requires only 8 units of communication to disseminate shares to nodes 8, 9 and 10.
This simple tweak can be employed to reduce the communication cost to the bottleneck nodes, whenever sufficient
local connectivity is available.
